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I. INTRODUCTION
URING the Survey period, a significant number of state and
federal courts adjudicated environmental disputes. The deci-
sions that followed provide insights for those of us who litigate
environmental claims; draft documents and perform due diligence in bus-
iness transactions; advise clients in regulatory and permitting actions; and
otherwise counsel our clients in environmental matters. The cases cov-
ered a range of legal issues including criminal environmental prosecution,
claims for property damages and cleanup costs, claims concerning endan-
gered species, and the application of administrative and constitutional is-
sues in the context of environmental law.
II. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
Criminal prosecution under environmental statutes continues at a
steady pace in Texas. Over the last several years, civil enforcement has
waned to some extent, while criminal prosecution has grown and appears
to occur more frequently than it did several years ago. This shift may be
a result of state and federal prosecutors as well as law enforcement per-
sonnel having become better trained and organized to investigate and
prosecute environmental "crimes." Prosecutors and law enforcement
view violations of the law as "crimes," while environmental agencies see
most issues as "civil" problems and see only the worst violations as poten-
tially "criminal."
Houston in particular has a well organized local, state, and federal law
enforcement and prosecution task force. Criminal prosecution under en-
vironmental laws has risen significantly in the Houston area as a result.
The Houston courts, thus, continue to be active in criminal environmental
enforcement cases. In Tarlton v. State,1 the appellant sought to overturn
his conviction for violating section 7.171 of the Texas Water Code 2 by
1. Tarlton v. State, 93 S.W.3d 168 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
2. The relevant provision of the Water Code follows:
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challenging the sufficiency of the indictment, the constitutionality of the
statute, and the sufficiency of the evidence. Tarlton had been convicted
in a trial to the court on one count for illegally disposing of used oil.3 The
court sentenced him to five years confinement and a $5,000 fine, but then
suspended the sentence and placed him on community supervision for
five years. 4 The conviction stemmed from a series of inspections. In No-
vember 1998, a City of Houston inspector found barrels and vehicles on
Tarlton's property and advised him to remove them. In February 1999,
an officer of the Houston Police Department found two 55-gallon drums
on a road near the appellant's home and an oil trail leading from the
drums to the appellant's residence. At the residence, the officer found
other leaking drums that had been punctured. When a city inspector re-
turned to Tarlton's residence in October 1999, the vehicles were gone but
the barrels remained, and dark liquid that the appellant identified as "au-
tomotive fluids" was seeping into the ground.5
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT
In Tarlton, the appellant first challenged the indictment on the grounds
that it failed to negate the exceptions to the statute and failed to inform
him of the portion of the statute under which he was charged.6 In re-
sponse to appellant's first challenge, the court found that, in charging
Tarlton with "knowingly dispos[ing] of used oil on land,"'7 the indictment
impliedly negated the two exceptions set forth in the statute. The court
found that "knowingly" negated the exception for unknowing disposal,
and that "dispos[ing] of used oil on land" negated the exception for the
mixing of used oil with waste to be disposed of in landfills. 8
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Tarlton also asserted two constitutional challenges, the first of which is
rather bizarre. First, Tarlton asserted that because the statute assessed
different penalties for corporations (fine only) and individuals (fine or
imprisonment) for the same crime, it violated the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution.9 Not surprisingly, the court found a
(a) A person commits an offense if the person:(2) knowingly mixes or commingles used oil with solid waste that is to be
disposed of in landfills or directly disposes of used oil on land or in land-
fills, unless the mixing or commingling of used oil with solid waste that is
to be disposed of in landfills is incident to and the unavoidable result of
the mechanical shredding of motor vehicles, appliances, or other items of
scrap, used, or obsolete metals....
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.176(a)(2) (Vernon 2000).
3. Tarton, 93 S.W.3d at 171.
4. Id. at 171-72.
5. Id. at 177.
6. Id. at 172. The court noted that the Penal Code requires the State to negate the
existence of any exception to an offense in the indictment. Id. at 173.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 173.
9. Id. at 176.
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rational basis for this distinction in that a corporation cannot be impris-
oned. 10 Second, Tarlton argued the statute was unconstitutionally vague
in that it (1) failed to provide sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct
and (2) provided law enforcement officers unbridled discretion in their
enforcement of the statute by failing to define "used oil." The court
noted that undefined words are given their plain meaning absent clear
intent to the contrary. Finding that Webster's defines the term "used" to
mean "employed in accomplishing something," the court determined that
oil is either used or not and held that the statute, as applied, provided fair
warning."
C. MENS REA
In Shagroun v. State,'2 another Houston case, the appellant, Shagroun,
raised constitutional and evidentiary challenges to his conviction for vio-
lating section 365.012(f)(1) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act by dumping
the trash-filled contents of a van on private property. Shagroun chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that it did not
require a culpable mental state, or mens rea.13 Although he had failed to
properly preserve this complaint, the court applied the Rabb14 rule to
address Shagroun's complaint that the statute is facially unconstitutional.
The Rabb rule requires appellate courts to consider "the constitutionality
of a statute upon which a defendant's conviction is based[, whether or not
the issue is] raised for the first time on appeal." 15
Shagroun complained that section 365.012 of the Texas Health and
Safety Code was unconstitutional because the information alleging his vi-
olation of the statute did not set forth a culpable mental state.16 The
statute states:
"A person commits an offense if the person disposes or allows or
permits the disposal of litter or other solid waste at a place that is not
an approved solid waste site, including a place on or within 300 feet
of a public highway, on a right-of-way, [or] on other public or private
property .... , 7
Section 6.02 of the Texas Penal Code provides that the definition of a
crime must require a culpable mental state unless the definition plainly
dispenses with it.1s If the definition neither prescribes nor dispenses with
a culpable mental state, then "intent, knowledge, or recklessness will suf-
10. Id. at 176-77.
11. Id. at 175-76. The court also relied on Webster's to determine the meaning of the
term "land" as used in the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Id. at 174.
12. Shagroun v. State, No. 01-00-00130-CR (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] May 30,
2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 4001.
13. Id. at *4.
14. Id. at *5 (citing Rabb v. State, 730 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at *4.
17. Id. at *5 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 365.012(a) (Vernon
2002)).
18. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (Vernon 1994).
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fice to establish criminal responsibility."' 9 Based on the factors set out in
Aguirre v. State, the court determined that a culpable mental state is re-
quired for a violation of section 365.012.20 The court reasoned that due
to "the relatively minor danger to public health and safety [as compared
with] the severity of the punishment, .. . the legislature did not intend the
statute to be a strict liability offense."'' l Finding that a culpable mental
state is in fact required and that section 6.02 of the Penal Code provides
the mens rea required for criminal responsibility, the court concluded that
the statute is not unconstitutional. 22
D. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The appellants in both Tarlton and Shagroun also raised challenges
based upon the factual sufficiency of the evidence. The Tarlton court
found the evidence sufficient to support Tarlton's conviction for know-
ingly disposing of used oil on land where a police officer found two leak-
ing drums of oil with an "oil trail" that ran from the drums to the
appellant's residence and where inspections by the City of Houston in
1998 and 1999 identified leaking drums of black liquid oil on the appel-
lant's property that the appellant identified as automotive fluids.23
Likewise, the court in Shagroun had no difficulty finding that Mr.
Shagroun disposed of at least 500 pounds or 100 cubic feet of waste. The
court based its decision on testimony that the interior dimensions of the
van were four to five feet high by four feet wide by eight to ten feet long;
photographs taken of the van that showed that its interior was full of
trash; and an officer's estimate of the volume of trash as 160 cubic feet
and the weight as 750 pounds. 24
III. ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS AND COST
RECOVERY CLAIMS
A. ENVIRONMENTAL INDEMNIFICATION
For yet another year, the legal interpretation of indemnities and other
environmental provisions of contracts has been adjudicated in a Texas
case. Two questions in El Paso Refining, LP v. TRMI Holdings, Inc.25
were (1) whether the relevant indemnity covered environmental liabili-
ties and (2) whether certain parties were covered by that indemnity. An-
other issue that arose was whether environmental provisions in a sale
agreement apply to future landowners.
19. Id. § 6.02(c).
20. Shagroun, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 4001 at *7 (citing Aguirre v. State, 22 S.W.3d
463, 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).
21. Id. at *7.
22. Id. at *8.
23. Tarlton, 93 S.W.3d at 177-78.
24. Shagroun, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 4001, at *11.
25. El Paso Refinery, LP v. TRMI Holdings, Inc., 302 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2002).
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The facts involve a sale of an El Paso refinery by TRMI Holdings, Inc.,
("TRMI") then a Texaco subsidiary, to El Paso Refinery, Inc.,
("Debtor") which subsequently went into bankruptcy. 26 The purchase
and sale agreement and the deed for the property on which the refinery is
located contained representations and warranties and indemnification re-
garding environmental conditions at the refinery. 27 As many attorneys
now include in such documents, both documents in this case included
provisions that attempted to prevent future landowners from asserting
claims against the seller, here TRMI, or from attempting to compel
TRMI to take remedial action. The deed filed with the county also at-
tempted to prevent claims by future landowners against the seller.
Six years after the purchase, the purchaser, Debtor, then went into
bankruptcy. As part of the bankruptcy proceeding, the lenders reached
an agreement with Debtor to foreclose on the property and sell it. A
term sheet ("Term Sheet") signed by the Debtor and its lenders provided
that the acquiring entity would be
"responsible for all environmental risks associated with the refinery
assets from and after the date of foreclosure. The Acquiring Entity
shall take the refinery assets subject to all written existing remedial
orders. The Acquiring Entity shall not assert any claims for contri-
bution and/or indemnity against the estate for environmental
liability. "28
The lenders were not so kind to TRMI and other previous refinery
owners or operators. They foreclosed on the refinery and transferred it
to a newly created entity, Refinery Holding Company, LP ("RHC").
RHC then gave notice it would seek recovery from TRMI and other pre-
vious owners for environmental cleanup of the refinery. TRMI submitted
a claim in the Debtor bankruptcy proceeding for indemnification, which
led to a settlement agreement between TRMI and Debtor.
The plot thickened as to the indemnification trail from TRMI to
Debtor to RHC. TRMI argued that it was indemnified by Debtor, which
was impliedly indemnified by RHC. Thus, RHC had no claim against
TRMI. The bankruptcy court agreed and applied the "circuitry of action"
doctrine.29 In contrast, the court held that TRMI and the former refinery
owner Texaco were not third-party beneficiaries of the Term Sheet, and
that the original purchase and sale agreement did not bind RHC.
Appeal was made to the district court and then to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
1. Application of the Circuitry of Action Doctrine
The first issue before the court was whether an implied indemnification
was created by the Term Sheet between Debtor and RHC. The circuitry
26. See id. at 346.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 347.
29. See id. at 347-48.
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of action doctrine is applied by Texas courts where one party by virtue of
contract or settlement would end up indemnifying another party for its
own original claim, 30 here RHC to TRMI to Debtor and back to RHC.
TRMI and Debtor did not dispute that Debtor owed indemnification to
TRMI for the environmental conditions at the refinery. RHC, on the
other hand, did dispute whether it owed indemnification to Debtor for
these conditions.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court's decision that certain
language in the Term Sheet created an implied indemnity. The language
was as follows: "The acquiring entity ... shall not assert any claims for
contribution and/or indemnity against the estate for environmental liabil-
ity."'31 The district court had ruled that no indemnity was clearly ex-
pressed. This was in part based on the Texas express negligence rule
which provides that parties seeking to indemnify the indemnitee from the
consequences of its own negligence must express that intent in specific
terms."
32
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that no implied indem-
nity was created by the Term Sheet's environmental provision. The Fifth
Circuit cited several Texas cases providing that circuitry of action arises
where "an affirmative and unequivocal agreement to indemnify and hold
the settling defendant harmless from any and all related claims."' 33 The
court interpreted the language of the Term Sheet as a covenant not to
sue, without any language regarding indemnification. As for the cove-
nant not to sue, the court concluded that it did not mention any related
claims or claims arising out of or related to the agreement. Apparently
the court concluded that the covenant not to sue did not specifically apply
to any claims against prior owners or operators. Another important issue
was that the settlement agreement between Debtor and TRMI was en-
tered into after the Term Sheet. Thus, the court found that there was no
intent to impliedly indemnify TRMI. However, the court did acknowl-
edge that the 1986 purchase and sale agreement between Debtor and
TRMI contained an environmental indemnity, but it was not guaranteed
until after the post-Term Sheet agreement. 34 It is not clear whether the
court would have reached a different result if the matter had been adjudi-
cated outside of a bankruptcy proceeding.
30. See id. at 349-50 (citing Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. McKown, 580 S.W.2d 435, 440
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). In a footnote, the court also cites to Pales-
tine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964) and Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 665 S.W.2d. 414, 430 (Tex. 1984). Id. at 350 n.5.
31. Id. at 350.
32. Id. at 350 n.7 (quoting language in Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d
705, 708 (Tex. 1987)).
33. Id. at 351 (citing Moore v. Southwestern Electric Power, 737 F.2d, 496, 501 (5th
Cir. 1984); McKown, 580 S.W. 2d at 439; Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779,
783-84 (Tex. Civ App.-Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
34. See id. at 351 n.9.
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2. Assumption of Unknown Environmental Conditions
The next question for the court was whether RHC had assumed all
unknown environmental conditions at the refinery. The Term Sheet pro-
vided that RHC would be responsible for "all environmental risks associ-
ated with the refinery assets from and after the date of foreclosure. 35
The parties differed over the proper interpretation of the phrase "from
and after the date of foreclosure." The way the court interpreted the
effect of this phrase provides a lesson not only for those litigating over
environmental contractual provisions and indemnities but also for those
drafting such provisions. The Debtor took the position that the phrase
modified the term "all environmental risks" and that RHC therefore as-
sumed the liability for both pre- and post-foreclosure environmental lia-
bilities.36 The court rejected the argument that this language clarified "all
environmental liabilities."
The court decided that if the parties meant "all" then the language
"from and after" acquisition would not be necessary. However, such lan-
guage is common in environmental provisions and other contractual pro-
visions. Redundancy is often meant to clarify what the parties mean. The
court then concluded that because the contract specifically stated that a
Texas Water Commission order was covered and that the acquirer would
take liability for that order, the prior sentence in which "all" was used
could not mean pre-acquisition liabilities. The court concluded that there
could not be redundancy in a contract. 37 In reality, most practicing law-
yers in drafting contracts redundancy is frequently used for the purpose
of trying to emphasize intent.
The court then turned to the question of the start date of the assump-
tion of liability. Based on the language of the Term Sheet, "from and
after the date of foreclosure," the court determined that the assumption
of liability started after foreclosure.38 This is at least a reasonable inter-
pretation of the language. What was more important, and should be
remembered by litigators and drafters alike, is that the court admitted
into evidence the drafts negotiated by the parties before a final contract
was agreed upon by the parties.39 One of the drafts of the Term Sheet
required RHC to assume all known and unknown environmental liabili-
ties. This language was not adopted in the final draft. The court relied
upon this evidence to conclude that the parties did not intend to include
past unknown liabilities. The court further noted that the bankruptcy ex-
aminer had testified that the term lenders would only assume known en-
vironmental liabilities. 40
35. Id. at 352.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 353.
39. See id. at 353 n.14.
40. Id. at 353 n.15.
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3. Third Party Beneficiary Argument
The next argument made by TRMI was that it was a third party benefi-
ciary to the Term Sheet. The court rejected this argument because of the
lack of any clear evidence that the parties intended to benefit TRMI.41
Citing Texas law, the court concluded that the presumption that parities
contract to benefit only themselves was not overcome by any evidence
presented by TRMI and that the contract made no reference to TRMI or
related parties directly or indirectly.
4. Ability to Bind Future Landowners to Releases
The next question the court faced was whether the release from the
Debtor to TRMI and related parties ran with the land and was binding
upon future landowners. The parties had included language regarding
the release in the deed conveying the property. The deed contained cove-
nants by which future landowners would be prevented from seeking con-
tribution from TRMI and related parties for remediation costs and from
attempting to compel TRMI and related parties to remediate the refin-
ery. TRMI argued that the language creates either a covenant running
with the land or an equitable servitude.42
In determining whether the covenant runs with the land, the court ap-
plied the test in Texas.
Under Texas law, a covenant runs with the land .. .when it: (1)
touches and concerns the land; (2) relates to a thing in existence, or
specifically binds the parties and their assigns; (3) is intended by the
original parties to run with the land; and (4) when the successor to
the burden has notice.43
The court concluded that the only issue the parties disputed was whether
the covenant "touches and concerns" the land at issue. The court cited
Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., for the proper test.44
In that case, the Texas Supreme Court laid down the rule that "a cove-
nant touches and concerns [land] when it affects the 'nature, quality or
value of the thing demised, independently of collateral circumstances, or
if it affect[s] the mode of enjoying it.' "45 The parties disagreed on the
test to use. Older Texas cases look to whether there was a benefit and
burden, while newer cases look only at whether the land was burdened.
The Fifth Circuit agreed the test in Texas was the latter.
In applying this test, the court concluded that the land was not itself
burdened, but rather the burden or benefit created by the deed affected
TRMI, not the land. The owner of the refinery property could take reme-
41. Id. at 354.
42. Id. at 355.
43. Id. (quoting Inwood N. Homeowner's Ass'n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex.
1987)).
44. Id. at 356 (citing Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.
1982)).
45. Id. (quoting Westland Oil Dev. Corp., 637 S.W.2d at 911).
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dial action or not, pollute the land or not. What the owner could not do
was seek contribution for what it did from TRMI. The court concluded
that there was no restriction on the use of the land and that TRMI could
not enter and take action on the land. 46 The court viewed the agreement
as a covenant to pay an encumbrance, which does not run with the land.47
TRMI argued that the Westland Oil case was on point. In that case,
once a test well was drilled on the land, one party was required to assign
the oil and gas leases. 48 The Fifth Circuit was unconvinced. It concluded
that in Westland Oil the covenant was triggered once an act on and affect-
ing the land had occurred. The court decided that the act of payment was
an act taken on the land, but the prohibition of suing once cleanup took
place at the refinery was too tenuous. The court did not explain how it
reached this conclusion. It would appear to be the same: in one case, an
action is required, and another is prohibited, once the activity on the land
occurs.
The court would not enforce a prohibition on a cost recovery or contri-
bution claim in a deed against future landowners. This decision imposes a
dilemma for those representing defendants in environmental litigation:
How does one who is settling with a current landowner bind future land-
owners from filing tort or statutory claims in suits to require cleanup, to
seek damages, or to recover cleanup costs? If the Fifth Circuit ruling is
adopted by Texas courts, this may prove hard to accomplish.
B. COST RECOVERY AND CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS UNDER
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
1. Right of Cost Recovery Under CERCLA Without First Being Sued
The ability of private parties to conduct investigation and remediation
of their property and then to recover the costs of those actions from other
liable private parties has been a mainstay of environmental law for many
years. These "cost recovery claims" as they have been called have fre-
quently been brought under section 113 of the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CER-
CLA"). 49 The ability to file such federal claims was questioned in a panel
opinion issued by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.50 In that case, the
court concluded that the statutory language permits the plaintiff to file
such a claim only during or following a federal CERCLA action against
it.51 The full en banc panel reversed this holding, and held that the plain-
tiff need not be a current or former defendant in a CERCLA action to
file a suit against other responsible parties to recover the costs it has ex-
46. Id. at 356-57.
47. Id. at 357.
48. Id. (citing Westland Oil, 637 S.W.2d at 907).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2000).
50. See Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Aviall Servs. f].
51. Id. at 138.
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pended to remediate a contaminated site.52
Section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA in pertinent part provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is lia-
ble or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or
following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under
section 9607(a) of this title .... Nothing in this subsection shall di-
minish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in
the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section
9607 of this title.5 3
In affirming the holding of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, a divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "a party can seek a § 113(f)(1)
contribution claim only if there is a prior or pending federal § 106 or
§ 107(a) action against it.''54 With respect to the first sentence of section
113(f)(1), the panel majority understood the term "contribution" to re-
quire that a tortfeasor first face judgment before seeking contribution
from other parties 55 and the term "may" as meaning shall or must
thereby creating an exclusive cause of action.56 The panel majority
viewed the final sentence (the "savings clause") only as an affirmation of
a party's right to bring contribution actions based on state law. 57
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, first reviewed the statutory text and
then the legislative history of section 113 of CERCLA.58 The court found
that it would not have made sense for Congress to expressly endorse a
contribution action under the original terms of the act but then to cut off
that cause of action unless the plaintiff was a current or past defendant in
a CERCLA suit. The court read the language of section 113 to be per-
missive, rather than exclusive, because the term "may" was used instead
of the term "only."
The Fifth Circuit cited a list of opinions issued after the enactment of
section 113 of CERCLA in 1986. A U.S. Supreme Court decision had
reviewed the ability to bring a cause of action under section 113 and con-
cluded that it was specifically allowed. 59 Other Fifth Circuit opinions and
other circuit court of appeals had similarly ruled a contribution claim was
allowed by parties without first being a defendant in a CERCLA
proceeding.
Finally, the court reviewed the policy implications of the panel's ruling.
The court believed the ruling would have impeded the successful imple-
52. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 2002) [herein-
after Aviall Servs. II].
53. Id. at 679-80 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000)).
54. Aviall Servs. 1, 263 F.3d at 137.
55. Id. at 138.
56. Id. at 138-39.
57. Id. at 139.
58. See Aviall Servs. II, 312 F.3d at 683-84 & 686-87.




mentation of CERCLA by allowing certain responsible parties to not
only move forward with remediation without first being sued, and but
also to then seek to allocate those costs among other responsible parties.
The voluntary reporting and remediation of sites would have been seri-
ously discouraged. The court reversed and remanded the case back to the
district court to decide if the proper notice had been given to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Attorney General, and
whether the plaintiff had complied with the National Contingency Oil
and Hazardous Substance Pollution Plan.60
2. Federal Question and Removal Issues
In MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo the question of the district court's
jurisdiction (i) based on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to CER-
CLA and (ii) by means of the All Writs Act.61 In 1994, MSOF Corpora-
tion and Jay Paul Leblanc, the plaintiffs, who own land in the Devil's
Swamp area in the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, filed suit
against Exxon Corporation and others on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated landowners, in Louisiana state court. Plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants, who were generators of hazardous waste that
was disposed at the PPI facility in Devil's Swamp, were responsible for
contaminating plaintiffs' land with toxic chemicals that emanated from
the PPI facility. The defendants removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs filed a
motion to remand, asserting that the district court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction; the district court denied their motion. The defend-
ants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their
motion.
a. Federal Question Jurisdiction
The court relied on several provisions of the United States Code to
make its decision. Title 28 of the United States Code states that "[a]ny
civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. '62 Further, "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."'63 CERCLA also provides that "the United
States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all con-
troversies arising under [CERCLA] without regard to the citizenship of
the parties or the amount in controversy. '64
60. Id. at 691.
61. MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 295 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2002).
62. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000)).
63. Id. (28 U.S.C. § 1331).
64. Id. at 489-90 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (2002)).
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When a federal question appears on the face of a plaintiff's well-
pleaded complaint, a federal court has original or removal jurisdiction.65
Conversely, a federal court generally does not have original or removal
jurisdiction if a plaintiff properly pleads only a state law cause of action. 66
However, "the 'artful pleading' doctrine is an 'independent corollary to
the well-pleaded complaint rule ... [that] allows removal where federal
law completely preempts a plaintiff's state law claim"' even if the plaintiff
fails to plead necessary federal questions.67
In this case, the plaintiffs alleged negligence and strict liability under
Louisiana law. The only reference to federal law in the plaintiffs' com-
plaint was an allegation that the PPI facility was maintained in violation
of federal regulations as well as in violation of state and local regulations.
The defendants argued that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' state law alle-
gations, they were actually seeking relief under CERCLA. Citing CER-
CLA's saving clauses, which preserve parties' rights arising under state
law, the court concluded that "CERCLA does not completely preempt
the plaintiffs' claims under Louisiana state law."'68 The court held that no
federal question jurisdiction arose and that the artful pleading doctrine
does not apply, thereby entitling the plaintiffs to rely exclusively on state
law causes of action.69
b. Removal Jurisdiction under the All Writs Act
In 1980, the United States Department of Justice, on behalf of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, sued the defendants in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under CERCLA. The
defendants entered into a consent decree in that case in which they
agreed to investigate and remediate contamination from the former PPI
facility. The consent decree also provided that the defendants monitor
the site under the continuing supervision of the judge for thirty years af-
ter the completion of the remediation. The defendants therefore argued
that the All Writs Act conferred jurisdiction because of the potential for
interference with the court's earlier consent decree. 70
"The All Writs Act ... provides: 'The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropri-
ate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law."' 71 The court noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has
held that the All Writs Act may authorize a federal court to issue orders
'as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustra-
tion of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction other-
65. Id. at 490 (citing for example, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1986)).
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470 (1998)).
68. Id. at 491.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 488-89.
71. Id. at 492 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000)).
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wise obtained." 72 The All Writs Act, however, "is not an independent
grant of jurisdiction, ' 73 The Fifth Circuit had previously held that the All
Writs Act could not be a vehicle for removal except under "extraordinary
circumstances. 74
The court concluded that "[tihe circumstances of this case do not 'indis-
putably demand' that removal is 'absolutely necessary to vouchsafe the
central integrity' of the consent decree."' 75 None of the plaintiffs' Louisi-
ana law claims or demands for compensatory damages posed an actual
threat to the consent decree at the time of the decision. However, the
court opined that should an actual threat to the consent decree arise as
the case proceeds in state court, circumstances might permit the federal
district court to enjoin proceedings. The court held that the All Writs Act
does not confer federal jurisdiction in this case.76
The court questioned whether the All Writs Act can ever serve as the
sole basis for removal jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has
denied certiorari on this issue. 77
C. TORT CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
1. Statutes of Limitations and the Effect of CERLA Provision on
Accrual Dates
In Achee v. Port Drum Co., the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas assessed the issue of whether the plaintiffs'
claims for injuries from the use of hazardous material at a barrel cleaning
plant were barred by the applicable limitations periods.78 In the case, the
plaintiffs sued, among others, a company that cleaned and recycled metal
barrels, alleging several state law claims and federal law claims under Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title VII of the Fair Housing
Act.79
In their motion, the defendants argued that summary judgment was
proper because the plaintiffs were barred by limitations from asserting
both their state and federal claims. The defendants contended that the
absolute latest accrual date for the plaintiffs' claims was when the com-
pany ceased operations and closed its plant in 1990, roughly six years
before suit was filed. On the other hand, the plaintiffs contended that
their causes of action accrued as late as 1995 or 1996 pursuant to doc-
trines extending the accrual date.80 Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that
they timely filed their claims because the wrongful acts committed by the
72. Id. (quoting United States v. New York Tel., 434 U.S. 159 (1977)).
73. Id. (citing In re McBryde, 117 F.3d 208, 220 (5th Cir. 1997)).
74. Id. (citing Texas v. Real Parties in Interest, 259 F.3d 387, 395 (5th Cir. 2001)).
75. Id. at 493 (quoting Real Parties in Interest, 259 F.3d at 395).
76. Id.
77. NPC Servs., Inc. v. MSOF Corp., 123 S. Ct. 623 (2002).
78. Achee v. Port Drum Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725-27 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
79. Id. at 726.
80. Id. The Texas discovery rule and the federally required commencement date set
forth in CERCLA. Id.
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defendants constituted continuing torts and because the defendants
fraudulently concealed environmental problems in and around their facil-
ity, thereby tolling the applicable statute of limitations. Lastly, the plain-
tiffs asserted that their claims were not time barred based on the open
courts provision of the Texas Constitution.8'
The court rejected all of the plaintiffs' arguments and granted summary
judgment to the defendant based on limitations.8 2 With regard to the
plaintiffs' state law claims, the court concluded that all of the claims were
barred, regardless of whether the period was two years or four, since the
state law claims accrued when the company closed the barrel plant in
1990, nearly six years before the individuals filed suit.8 3 Likewise, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to file their Title VI claims
within the applicable two-year limitations period dictated by state law in
the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, 4 and that the Title VIII
claims were barred by the applicable two-year limitations dictated by fed-
eral law.85
Furthermore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were not
saved by various tolling doctrines. First, the Texas discovery rule was in-
applicable "because [the] alleged wrongful acts and the resulting injuries
were not 'inherently undiscoverable." 86 The court ruled that the "feder-
ally required commencement date" in CERCLA did not help the plain-
tiffs. 87 That provision may be used to preempt state accrual dates so that
accrual occurs when the plaintiffs "knew or reasonably should have
known" that injuries were caused by hazardous substances.s8 But the
court concluded that even if that provision applied in a non-CERCLA
lawsuit, such as the subject case, the plaintiffs knew that their injuries
were caused by the hazardous substance used at the barrel plant at least
fifteen years before filing suit.8 9 Next, the court concluded that the con-
tinuing tort doctrine did not apply because the defendants' alleged tor-
tious conduct ceased when the barrel plant was closed in 1990.90 The
court concluded that there was no evidence that fraud delayed discovery
of the plaintiffs' claims, so the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not
toll the limitations period.91 Finally, the court held that the application of
the appropriate statutes of limitations did not violate the plaintiffs' rights
under the Texas Open Courts Provision. 92
81. Id. at 726-27.
82. Id. at 725.
83. Id. at 729-30.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 730 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A)).
86. Id. at 731.
87. Id. at 735.
88. Id. at 734-35.
89. Id. at 735.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 739.
92. Id. at 740.
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Thus, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants having
concluded that the summary judgment evidence indicated "no genuine
issues of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs' claims [were]
time-barred. 93
In another case, Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the court similarly
ruled that the plaintiff's action was barred by limitations. 94 The plaintiff
had sued several parties, including several oil companies for groundwater
contamination, asserting that the operation of open saltwater pits, which
had been covered over and were no longer in operation, had contami-
nated the groundwater.9 5
Phillips Petroleum Co. ("Phillips") filed a no evidence motion for sum-
mary judgment, and offered evidence that it had operated only one well
in the area and had not operated any saltwater disposal pits. 96 The court
ruled that the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment be-
cause a Texas Railroad Commission employee had testified that when
Phillips had wells in the area in the 1960s, it was common to dispose of
salt water in pits and that a pit had been present in the area. With respect
to the same motion against Pioneer Natural Resources Company, the
court ruled that the evidence provided was only that Pioneer currently
operated wells in the area. Because there was no evidence of improper
disposal, summary judgment was properly granted against the plaintiff.
With respect to the motions for summary judgment on limitations,
three issues were presented: (1) whether a permanent or temporary in-
jury to land had occurred, (2) whether a fraudulent concealment had oc-
curred, and (3) whether the request for injunctive relief and continuing
tort doctrine had been properly addressed. 97 The court addressed the
history of several Texas cases on the first issue-the question of perma-
nent injury to property. In the present case, Phillips had presented evi-
dence that the pits had been filled in many years ago and that the
contamination from the pits did not occur after backfilling because the
pits no longer contained standing water to dissolve and transport the con-
taminants into the groundwater below.98 The court concluded that "the
activity which caused the initial contamination of the groundwater,
namely, the operation of the open pits, was a continuous source of pollu-
tion rather than the type of sporadic activity or injury at issue in those
cases finding a temporary injury."99 The court found that although "the
degree of contamination varies, [it does not ever become] non-existent or
significantly diminished due to a change in circumstances." 10 0 Thus, the
93. Id.
94. Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 65 S.W.3d 262, 276 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2001,
pet. denied).
95. Id. at 267.
96. Id. at 269.
97. Id. at 270.
98. Id. at 273.




court found the injury to the land to be permanent.
The court concluded that the plaintiff knew about the contamination
but did not file suit until many years later, so the plaintiff's claims for
groundwater contamination were barred by the statute of limitations and
none of the exceptions pleaded by the plaintiff avoided this defense. The
state environmental agency at the time, the Texas Water Commission,
had informed the plaintiff about the discovery of contamination; thus, the
plaintiff was on notice to conduct further investigation. The court ruled
that since the plaintiff did not bring his cause of action for trespass, nui-
sance, and negligence within two years from that point, his claims were
barred by limitations. The court did not apply the continuing tort doc-
trine to permanent injury to land. The court ruled that the claim of fraud-
ulent concealment (the second issue) did not prevent the application of
the limitations bar because when the plaintiff discovered the contamina-
tion any tolling effect ended. 10 1 With respect to the request for an injunc-
tion, (the third issue) the court ruled that it was not a separate claim,
rather it was a type of relief that could be granted for a nuisance cause of
action.10 2
The court did not appear to deal with a situation in which the release of
contamination had occurred in the past, and releases were still occurring.
An example of such a situation would be if one of the oil companies were
still dumping or releasing salt water to the surface or to the same or new
pits. The question is whether a party gains a license to continue polluting
in a situation of a permanent injury to land. Once the two-year statute of
limitations has run, does the plaintiff have any judicial recourse to pre-
vent the ongoing actions of the defendant who continues to dump pollu-
tants into the soil, a river or creek, or the groundwater? This issue leaves
open a question for the courts to determine.
Similarly, in White Oak Bend Municipal Utility District v. Robertson, a
Texas Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a suit based on the statute
of limitations. 10 3 The issue before the court was whether the trial court
erred in dismissing the negligence claims of White Oak Municipal Utility
District ("White Oak") against Guy J. Robertson and Douglas L. Mulva-
ney ("Robertson and Mulvaney"), the co-trustees of a liquidating trust
for the liabilities of Isabella Enterprises, Inc., formerly known as Pilgrim
Enterprises, Inc. ("Pilgrim"), a dissolved corporation. 10 4 The trial court
held that the two-year statute of limitations barred this action.10 5
Pilgrim had operated a dry-cleaning store in White Oak from 1985 until
1996. "As early as 1988, White Oak knew that Pilgrim was discharging
101. Id. at 276.
102. Id.
103. White Oak Mun. Util. Dist. v. Robertson, No. 14-00-00155-CV (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] Feb. 21, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1315.
104. Id. at "1, *4.
105. Id. at *4, *6-7.
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dry-cleaning solvents into [its] sewer pipes. ' 10 6 "[In] September of 1992,
certain manhole covers in the White Oak sewer system and parts of the
sidewalks above the sewer pipes began to visibly sink." In September
and October of 1995, White Oak arranged for smoke testing and vide-
otaping of the sewer pipes respectively, which confirmed that the sewer
pipes had been damaged. In a letter from White Oak's engineers to the
Texas Water Development Board, White Oak's engineers described 'the
videotape of the sewer pipes as evidence that the sewer pipe damage was
likely caused by exposure to dry cleaning solvents. 10 7 White Oak filed
suit against Robertson and Mulvaney in April 1999.
The parties agreed that the discovery rule applies. "The discovery
rule[, however, would toll the] limitations only until White Oak [had]
knowledge of facts that would cause a reasonably prudent person to
make an inquiry that would lead to the discovery of White Oak's claims
for damage to its sewer pipes.1108 White Oak argued that the discovery
rule tolled limitations until October 27, 1995, when its engineers advised
the Texas Water Development Board of the probable connection be-
tween the sinking of the manhole covers and the dry cleaning solvent
damage to its sewer pipes. "White Oak [further] argue[d that] its claims
were therefore not barred by limitations on September 1, 1997, when a
new statute took effect that abolished the two-year limitations as a de-
fense against claims made by municipal utility districts like White
Oak."10 9
The appellate court concluded that Robertson and Mulvaney "conclu-
sively proved that, long before September 1, 1995, White Oak had knowl-
edge of the sinking manhole covers and sidewalks and that this
knowledge would cause a reasonably prudent person to make an inquiry
which would have led to the discovery of damage to White Oak's sewer
pipes" before that date. 110 Presuming that the new statute that abolished
the two-year statute of limitations as a defense against claims made by
municipal utility districts like White Oak is not retroactive, the appellate
court further concluded that it did not apply to White Oak's claims be-
cause they were already barred when the statute took effect on Septem-
ber 1, 1997.111 The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's
judgment.1 12
106. Id. at *1.
107. Id. at *2-3.
108. Id. at *9-10 (citing White v. Bond, 362 S.W.2d 295, 295-96 (Tex. 1962); Corner-
stones Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monsanto Co., 889 S.W.2d 570, 576 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).
109. Id. at *6 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.003, 16.061 (Vernon
1997)).
110. Id. at *15.




2. Preemption of State Law Claims by Federal Statutes
In Dow AgroSciences, LLC v. Bates, the U. S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas addressed the preemption of state claims by
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). 113
In this case, the plaintiff herbicide manufacturer, Dow AgroSciences
("Dow"), brought a declaratory judgment action against a group of pea-
nut growers concerning the growers' demand letters regarding one of
Dow's products, a herbicide used to control weeds in peanuts.
114
Through the demand letters, the growers demanded payment for dam-
ages claiming that the herbicide failed to work as advertised. The grow-
ers also contended that the manufacturer's misrepresentation of the
product constituted false, misleading, and deceptive acts and practices.
Dow brought suit seeking declaratory judgment that the growers' claims
were preempted by FIFRA. 115
The court began its analysis of the issue by describing FIFRA and its
preemption clause. The court discussed how "FIFRA creates a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme for pesticide and herbicide labeling."
116
"Under its provisions, all herbicides sold in the United States must be
registered with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")," 117 and
herbicide labels must be approved by the EPA. 118 Next, the court de-
scribed FIFRA's preemption clause, which "provides that states 'shall not
impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging
in addition to or different from those required under' FIFRA." 19 The
court concluded that FIFRA's preemption clause expressly preempted
state laws, including tort claims, that imposed different or additional la-
beling requirements from those approved through the regulatory pro-
cess .10 In applying the law, the court found that the growers' implied
and express warranty claims were preempted because they challenged the
herbicide label.12 1
Likewise, the growers' other claims were preempted. The growers ar-
gued that their Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") and fraud
claims were not preempted because they arose from statements made by
Dow's representatives. But the court noted "that FIFRA preempts
claims that rely on advertising and marketing materials as the basis for
their DTPA practices and fraud claims," 122 and concluded "that FIFRA
preemption cannot be avoided 'simply because [a party] challenge[s] al-
leged misrepresentations that were made separately from the label.'"123
113. Dow AgroSciences, LLC v. Bates, 205 F. Supp. 2d 623, 625 (N.D. Tex. June 2002).
114. Id. at 624-25.
115. Id. at 625.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a)).
118. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)).
119. Id. at 626 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 627.
123. Id. (quoting Andrus v. AgrEvc USA Co., 178 F.3d 395, 400 (5th Cir. 1999)).
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The court noted that some of the representatives' statements merely re-
peated information contained on the label. For this reason, the court
held that FIFRA preempted the growers' DTPA claims.124 The court
also concluded that because the growers' negligence claims concerned a
failure to warn, those negligence claims were also preempted by
FIFRA.125 Because all claims were deemed preempted, the court
granted Dow's motion for summary judgment.
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of FIFRA preemption in
American Cyanamid Co. v. Geye.126 In that case, farmers brought suit
against a herbicide manufacturer, American Cyanamid Company
("ACC"), claiming that one of its products stunted root growth and inhib-
ited foliage development resulting in severe reduction in the farmers'
peanut crop yield. ACC sought summary judgment on the grounds that
FIFRA preempted the farmers' claims under breach of warranty, strict
liability, and DTPA.127
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the claims were not pre-
empted by FIFRA.128 In reaching that conclusion, the court explained
the scope of FIFRA's preemption. 12 9 First, the court noted that Congress
expressly provided that state actions regarding product labeling are pre-
empted to the extent that the content of the product label is regulated. 130
But, as the court explained, Congress permitted the EPA to elect not to
regulate product labeling with respect to a product's "efficacy," which is
"how well a product works.' 31 After considerable analysis, the court
concluded that the EPA did not regulate herbicide labels on the issue of
whether the product will be toxic to the crops that the product was in-
tended to assist. 132 Thus, without federal EPA regulation on this issue,
the court reasoned that the farmers' crop damage claim was not pre-
empted by FIFRA.133
3. Property Damages
In Waste Disposal Center, Inc. v. Larson, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals addressed the adequacy of testimonial evidence in a case
brought "against numerous defendants," including Waste Disposal
Center, Inc. ("Waste Disposal"), "who owned, operated, or transported
waste to a landfill."'1 34 The case was a limited appeal from a jury judg-
ment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Soila Valdez and Michelle Lar-
124. Id.
125. Id. at 628.
126. American Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, 79 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. 2002).
127. Id. at 23.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 23-24.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 25.
132. Id. at 28.
133. Id. at 29.
134. Waste Disposal Ctr., Inc. v. Larson, 74 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2002, pet. denied).
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son.' 35 The plaintiffs had sought damages for personal injury and
property damages based on multiple causes of action that included negli-
gence, trespass, and nuisance.136
The jury found that the defendants' negligence had proximately caused
the plaintiffs' property damage. "It also found [that the defendants] com-
mitted a willful trespass and created a nuisance on Valdez's property." It
awarded 1) damages to Valdez and Larson "for diminution of the market
value of their respective properties," 2) damages to Valdez "for mental
anguish arising as a result of the willful trespass and the nuisance," and 3)
exemplary damages to Valdez.137 On appeal, Waste Disposal argued that
there was no evidence to support the jury's award of actual damages and,
therefore, exemplary damages should not have been recovered.
138
First, the court addressed Waste Disposal's contention that there was
no evidence of a diminution in market value of either plaintiffs' property.
Waste Disposal argued that the only evidence on this issue, testimony
given by Valdez and Larson themselves, "reflect[ed] only their personal,
subjective feelings, and [did] not quantify market value or any reduction
[of market value]."'1 39 Citing the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Por-
ras v. Craig, the appellate court stated that "[a] property owner [may]
provide opinion testimony regarding diminution in market value resulting
from permanent damage to land, but the testimony must show that the
diminution refers to market value rather than intrinsic value or some
other value.' 40 The court held that Valdez satisfied that standard with
her testimony that "her property was not worth what she originally paid
for it[,] and that nobody would buy the place as it is."' 14 1 Similarly, the
court concluded that Larson's testimony regarding the value of her prop-
erty before the waste disposal and current value for the contaminated
land was legally sufficient to establish a diminution in market value.
Thus, Waste Disposal's first issue was overruled. 42
Next, the court addressed Waste Disposal's argument that "there [was]
no evidence to support the jury's award of mental anguish damages to
Valdez as a result of the alleged property damage.' 43 The appellate
court sustained Waste Disposal's second issue because it concluded that
Valdez's general testimony about her health concerns "provide[d] no evi-
dence of the nature, duration, or severity of [her] mental anguish, nor
does it establish a substantial disruption in her daily routine.' ' 44
In its third argument, Waste Disposal argued that "the award of exem-
plary damages to Valdez [could not] stand absent an award of actual dam-
135. Id. at 581.
136. Id. at 582.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 581-82.
139. Id. at 582.
140. Id. at 583 (citing Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1984)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 584.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 585.
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ages."'1 45 Having already concluded that "the evidence was legally
sufficient to support an award of property damages based on willful tres-
pass and/or nuisance," the court overruled this issue.146
In Bates v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc., the appellate court ad-
dressed the issue of temporary versus permanent damages in the context
of a nuisance claim.1 47 In Bates, the appellants, a group of neighbors who
resided near the defendant companies' manufacturing plants, alleged that
they were subject to nuisance conditions over a period of years caused by
noise, light, chemicals, dust, odors, and various other substances from the
companies' operations.' 48 The district court granted the companies' mo-
tion for partial summary judgment as to certain neighbors based on a
limitations defense.149
The issue before the appellate court was "whether the facts as asserted
in [the neighbors'] affidavits raise[d] a fact issue as to whether their dam-
ages result[ed] from a permanent nuisance or a temporary nuisance."'150
That distinction was critical because the issue of whether the two-year
period of limitations for nuisance had passed depended on whether the
nuisance was temporary or permanent. "An action for permanent dam-
ages to land must be brought within two years from the time of discovery
of the injury. Damages for temporary injuries may be recovered for the
two years prior to filing suit.'' The court described permanent injuries
to land as "constant and continuous, not occasional, intermittent, or re-
current.' 52 On the other hand, the court described temporary injuries to
land as "not continuous, but.., sporadic and contingent upon some irreg-
ular force such as rain. ' 153 The court also noted that another characteris-
tic of a temporary injury is the ability of a court of equity to enjoin the
injury-causing activity, unlike a permanent injury, which cannot be
terminated.' 54
The companies argued that the injuries were permanent and therefore
barred by limitations. They argued that several of the neighbors filed
affidavits describing their injuries using terms such as "ongoing," "con-
stant," and "continuous.1 155 Moreover, the companies noted that the af-
fidavits established that the neighbors had lived in the area for more than
two years before the lawsuit's filing date. Conversely, the neighbors ar-
gued that (1) "whether a nuisance and the resulting damages are tempo-
rary or permanent ... is a fact question;" (2) "nowhere in their affidavits
145. Id.
146. Id. at 585-86.
147. Bates v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
148. Id. at 311.
149. Id. at 310.
150. Id. at 311-12.
151. Id. at 312 (citing Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1984)).
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Bayouth, 671 S.W.2d at 868).
154. Id. at 314 (quoting Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1978)).
155. Id. at 313.
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did they describe the alleged nuisance as being 'continuous,' 'constant,' or
'continuing;"' and (3) "according to the affidavits, the complained of acts
occur only when the wind is blowing from a certain direction." 156 Thus,
the neighbors argued that the contradiction within the affidavits estab-
lished an issue of fact regarding whether the alleged nuisance is tempo-
rary or permanent. 157 The neighbors also argued that the injuries were
temporary in nature because they could be enjoined, and a permanent
injury cannot be terminated. 158
"After making every reasonable inference in [the neighbors'] favor re-
garding [the frequency of the injuries] and the feasibility of an injunctive
remedy, [the appellate court] conclude[d] that a genuine issue of material
fact existe[d] as to whether the nuisance alleged [was] permanent or tem-
porary."' 59 Thus, the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case.160
4. Evidence of Causation
In JNC Enterprises, Ltd. v. Hutson Industries, JNC Enterprises, Ltd.
and Preston Road Commercial Partners, Ltd. (collectively "JCN Enter-
prises") sued Hutson Industries, Inc. ("Hutson") for trespass, negligence,
negligence per se, and nuisance. 161 JCN Enterprises claimed that regu-
lated volatile organic compounds from Hutson's manufacturing plant
contaminated JNC Enterprises' property. 162 Following discovery, Hutson
moved for no-evidence summary judgment, alleging, among other things,
that JNC Enterprises presented no evidence that any act or omission by
Hutson in the past two years caused the contamination. 63 The trial court
granted Hutson's motion.164
On appeal, JNC Enterprises challenged the granting of the no-evidence
summary judgment on two grounds. First, it argued that the no-evidence
summary judgment was improper because causation of injury is not an
element of trespass or negligence per se.165 The court rejected that argu-
ment, stating that "it is elementary that causation of injury is an essential
element of negligence per se [and trespass]."'1 66 As a second argument,
JNC Enterprises contended that "there [was] compelling summary judg-
ment evidence that Hutson caused injury" to INC Enterprises' property
by allowing contamination from Hutson's property to flow to JNC Enter-
156. Id. at 313-14.




161. JNC Enters. Ltd. v. Hutson Indus., No. 05-01-01711-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug.




165. Id. at *2.
166. Id. at *3.
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prises' property. 167 In support, JNC Enterprises cited a number of envi-
ronmental reports and documents demonstrating that JNC Enterprises'
property was contaminated, that Hutson's property was the source, and
that remediation may take up to five years. 168 But, the appellate court
was unpersuaded that the evidence raised an issue of fact regarding "any
action Hutson [had] failed to take to prevent the contamination.' '169 To
the contrary, the court believed that issue was resolved by the testimony
of Hutson's expert that "any acts of remediation prior to the completion
of the investigation would be premature.' 170 Consequently, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in Hutson's
favor. 171
This opinion is cryptic at best. How the court viewed the elements of
the plaintiff's causes of action and the burden of proof on these elements
is unclear. The case raises some interesting points for defendants in these
cases to raise, but the legal analysis and arguments to support these
points are not elucidated in this opinion.
5. Standing and Duty to Restore Properties
In Exxon Corp. v. Pluff,172 the appellate court considered (1) whether
David Pluff ("Pluff"), the current owner of certain property that Exxon
Corporation ("Exxon") had formerly leased and on which Exxon had
drilled oil wells, had standing to assert a cause of action for injury to the
property against Exxon for not removing the abandoned oilfield materi-
als from the property, and (2) if Pluff had such standing, whether Exxon
had a contractual duty under the lease to remove the abandoned oilfield
materials from the property. Based on a jury's verdict, the trial court
entered judgment against Exxon for $30,000. This appeal followed. 173
a. Standing
As standing is a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction, the
appellate court conducted a de novo review of the trial court's determina-
tion of standing. The fundamental rule of law with respect to standing is
that "only the person whose primary legal right has been breached may
seek redress for an injury."'1 74 "The right to sue is a personal right that
belongs to the person who owns the property at the time of the injury," 175
and thus, does not pass to a subsequent purchaser of the property without
167. Id. at *2.
168. Id. at *4-5.
169. Id. at *5-6.
170. Id. at *6.
171. Id.
172. Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied).
173. Id. at 24.
174. Id. at 26-27 (citing Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976)).
175. Id. at 27 (citing Abbott v. City of Princeton, 721 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex. App.-




In the present case, "Exxon's drilling and production activities on the
property ceased prior to Pluff's purchase of the property in 1992."1 7
7
Further, Pluff's deed contained no assignment of any cause of action.
The court concluded that the facts in Senn v. Texaco are indistinguishable
from the case before it.178 In Senn, "the injuries occurred before [the
Senns] acquired the land and they did not obtain an assignment of any
cause of action belonging to their predecessors in title."'179 The court in
the Senn case concluded that the Senns did not have standing to assert a
cause of action against Texaco for injury to their property. 80 For the
same reasons, the Exxon Corp. court concluded that Pluff lacked stand-
ing to assert a cause of action against Exxon for injury to his property.' 8 '
b. Duty to Restore Property
Even if Pluff had standing to assert a cause of action against Exxon for
injury to the property, the court found that Exxon had no duty to restore
the property.' 82 Under the lease, Exxon had an express right, but not an
express duty, to remove oilfield materials on the expiration of the
lease.' 83 The court disagreed with Pluff's argument that such express
right constituted an express duty or an implied obligation of Exxon to
remove oilfield materials on the expiration of the lease.
184
IV. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
A. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION REJECTED WHERE
INDIVIDUAL NOT SPECIFICALLY THREATENED WITH SUITS
In Sheilds v. Norton, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard an ap-
peal by a landowner who had lost a summary judgment motion in a de-
claratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 85 Because letters
sent out by the Sierra Club to other parties, including a partnership in
which he was a partner, alleged violations of the ESA, the landowner felt
threatened that he would be sued individually as a result of his pumping
water from the Edwards Aquifer.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Senn v. Texaco, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no.
pet.)).
179. Id. (citing Senn, 55 S.W.3d at 226).
180. Id. at 28 (citing Senn, 55 S.W.3d at 226).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 29. "Paragraph six of the lease provides that: 'Exxon shall have the right at
any time during or after the expiration of this lease to remove all property and fixtures
placed by Exxon on said land including the right to draw and remove all casing."' Id.
184. Id.




The Fifth Circuit, rather than addressing the lower court's decision to
uphold the challenged provisions of the ESA, focused on the question of
whether the case was ripe for adjudication. The district court had said
that the case was a close call on the ripeness question, but concluded a
sufficient case or controversy existed. 186 The Fifth Circuit focused on the
litigation threat that the plaintiff asserted had been made against him.
The Sierra Club had in fact sent out three letters regarding alleged viola-
tions of the ESA. These three letters had been sent in 1990, 1994, and
1998. The Fifth Circuit and the district court both viewed such letters as
the pre-suit notice required under the ESA and as "sent to induce the
recipient to modify his actions so to avoid violation of the ESA."'1 87 The
district court relied on the 1990 and 1994 letters, which threatened litiga-
tion if necessary to address the alleged violations of the ESA. The 1998
letter was sent solely to the Edwards Aquifer Authority ("EAA"). 188
The court of appeals, however, did not find these letters to provide a
sufficient threat of litigation to permit a declaratory judgment action. Al-
though the plaintiff was a member of the Edwards Aquifer Authority
Board at the time, the plaintiff agreed he had no authority to sue on be-
half of that board.'8 9 The 1990 letter listed the plaintiff's partnership as
an addressee or potential violator of the ESA, but it did not list him indi-
vidually. The 1994 letter did not list him, his partnership, or the EAA.
Because the plaintiff had not received a letter individually and his part-
nership had not received a letter for eight years or more, the court con-
cluded that the threat of litigation against him was not sufficient to raise a
ripe controversy. The court remanded the case to the district court for
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.' 90
B. INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT ISSUED TO DEVELOPER UPHELD AS A
RESULT OF LAND PURCHASED TO PRESERVE MORE SIGNIFICANT
HABITAT FOR THE RELEVANT SPECIES
In another ESA case decided within the Survey period, the federal Dis-
trict Court in San Antonio upheld the decision of the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service ("Fish and Wildlife") to issue an incidental take permit of
three endangered species. In Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Service, the court, after a rather philosophical preamble to its
opinion in which it delved into religious duties to protect creation, upheld
the Fish and Wildlife decision. 191 The challenges were made under the
ESA and the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). The deci-
sion challenged involved the issuance of an incidental take permit to La
Cantera Development Company ("Developer") under section 10 of the
186. Id. at 835.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 836.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 836-37.
191. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 594,
596-98 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
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ESA.192 The ESA allows incidental take permits to be issued if the take,
which in this case, meant death, harm, or disturbance of an endangered
species, 193 is incidental to the project at issue. 194 Here, Developer did not
intend to harm the species involved, but the harm arose as a result of the
construction, operation, and management of the activities on the prop-
erty. 195 The basis for the challenge was threefold: (1) Fish and Wildlife
"failed to ensure that the 'applicant [for the take permit would], to the
maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of...
taking;"' (2) Fish and Wildlife's decision that "the development would
'not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild,"' and (3) Fish and Wildlife violated NEPA by con-
cluding there would be "no significant impact" and, thereby, not prepar-
ing an environmental impact statement.196 Fish and Wildlife and
Developer argued that the provisions of the ESA and NEPA had been
met by Fish and Wildlife.
C. MINIMIZATION AND MITIGATION OF IMPACT ON THE SPECIES
The argument on this aspect of the ESA focused largely on statements
by a particular scientist that had submitted comments and objections to
the action.197 The plaintiff argued that Fish and Wildlife had not focused
on the expense necessary to further reduce the impact of the develop-
ment, but acquiesced in the action. The Fish and Wildlife Habitat Con-
servation Planning Handbook provides that where the minimization and
mitigation program of the applicant can be shown to provide "substantial
benefit to the species," then less emphasis will be placed on the question
of the maximum practicable effort the applicant can exercise. 198 After an
exhaustive review in the text and footnotes, the court came to the conclu-
sion that since Developer instituted a one-acre set back for the caves on
the property to be developed, purchased land nearby that had much more
substantial caves, and planned to spend $4 million to implement the ac-
tions, Fish and Wildlife's decision that the mitigation program was suffi-
cient could not be overturned as being arbitrary and capricious.199
D. APPRECIABLE REDUCTION OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE SURVIVAL
AND RECOVERY OF THE SPECIES
The second argument of the plaintiff was that the plan decision of Fish
Wildlife that the taking would not appreciably reduce the likelihood of
the survival and recovery of the species was arbitrary and capricious. The
court further ruled that the Habitat Conservation Plan did not have to
192. Id. at 598.
193. See id. at 599 n.5.
194. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(i) (2002).
195. Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 598-99.
196. Id. at 601.
197. Id. at 607-09.
198. Id. at 609.
199. See id. at 618, 620-22.
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serve as a species recovery plan, but the court considered the biological
opinion issued by Fish and Wildlife to support the preservation and even
the recovery of the species because of the purchase and preservation of
the additional land. The plaintiff argued that the Habitat Recovery Plan
did not appreciably reduce the recovery of the species because the mean-
ing of conservation in the ESA is the implementation of methods and
procedures such that the protection of the species is no longer needed.200
Again, after an exhaustive review of the arguments made by the plain-
tiff, the arguments of the single scientist that the plaintiff relied upon, and
Fish and Wildlife's decision process, the court concluded that Fish and
Wildlife's decision in approving the plan was not arbitrary and capri-
cious.2 0' Having reviewed the ESA, the regulations promulgated under
the Act and case law, the court concluded that "the Service must develop
its biological opinion based upon the best scientific and commercial data
available regardless of the 'sufficiency' of that data. '202 The court be-
lieved Fish and Wildlife had done so. More importantly, it concluded that
section 10 of the ESA authorized incidental take permits to reduce the
impact on the species, but did not require mandatory actions to recover
endangered species. 20 3 The court ruled that it must defer to the agency
and that it could not find support for the plaintiff's contentions that "the
[Habitat Conservation Plan] contained major flaws in terms of technical
data relied upon, procedures employed, and conclusions reached. '204
E. FINDING OF No SIGNIFICANT IMPACT UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
The final argument of the plaintiff was that Fish and Wildlife violated
NEPA by finding that the development would not have a significant im-
pact on the on the environment, which allowed Fish and Wildlife to avoid
issuing an Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA.20 5 After re-
viewing Fifth Circuit precedent, the district court ruled that the proper
standard of review is whether a "finding of no significant impact"
("FONSI") was arbitrary and capricious.20 6 Four criteria were enumer-
ated for this judicial review: (1) "the agency must have accurately identi-
fied the relevant environmental concern;" (2) "once the agency has
identified the problem it must have taken a 'hard look' at the problem in
preparing the [environmental assessment];" (3) "if a finding of no signifi-
cant impact is made, the agency must be able to make a convincing case
for its finding;" and (4) "if the agency does find an impact of true signifi-
cance, preparation of an EIS can be avoided only if the agency finds that
200. Id. at 625 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2002)).
201. Id. at 646.
202. Id. at 632 (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1286-87
(E.D. Cal. 2000)).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 646.
205. See id. at 646.
206. Id. at 647-48.
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changes or safeguards in the project sufficiently reduce the impact to a
minimum. °20 7 In conducting this review the court concluded that it must
defer to the agency and not substitute its judgment for the agency's if the
agency has arrived at a reasoned judgment and considered the relevant
factors in making this decision.208
The court looked at the following factors raised by the plaintiff: (1) the
significance of the ecological area that was to be disturbed, (2) the con-
troversial impacts and unknown risks to the species, (3) the precedential
nature of the action, (4) the cumulative impacts of this action when added
to past, present and reasonably foreseeable future actions, and (5) the
destruction of significant scientific resources and the adverse effect on the
endangered species.20 9 In reviewing all of these factors, the court con-
cluded that despite the concerns raised by one scientist, Fish and Wildlife
had adequately considered each of these factors and discharged its duties
under NEPA.210 It also concluded that the finding of any significant im-
pact was "reduced to a minimum" by the mitigating actions of Developer
contained in the Environmental Assessment and the Habitat Conserva-
tion Plan.211 In the final words of the opinion, the court seemed reluctant
to find for Developer, concluding the following: "[T]he law and standard
of review which the Court is bound to apply are on the side of the devel-
opers and shoppers. [The developer has] hit a stand-up triple and the real
estate magnates are winning thus far. But Mother Nature bats last. 212
F. SUFFICIENCY OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND
APPROPRIATE USE OF MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN REVIEWING AGENCY DECISIONS
Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Van Winckle considered cross
motions for summary judgment regarding the sufficiency of the environ-
mental impact statement ("EIS") prepared by the United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") for its proposed construction of the Dallas
Floodway Extension ("DFE").213 The court noted the three standards
that guide its review: the summary judgment standard, the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") standard, and the NEPA standard. Unlike "typi-
cal" summary judgment motions, in cases such as this one where the court
is reviewing the decision of an administrative agency the entire factual
predicate is before the court in the form of the administrative record.2 14
Thus, rather than employ the Rule 56 standard,2 15 the relevant standard
was whether the agency could reasonably have found the facts as it did
207. Id. at 648.
208. Id. at 649-50.
209. Id. at 650-63.
210. Id. at 663.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Tex. Comm. on Natural Res. v. Van Winkle, 197 F. Supp. 2d 586 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
214. Id. at 595.
215. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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and whether the evidence permitted the agency to make the decision that
it did.2 16 The agency's action was also subject to review under section 702
of the APA, where the relevant inquiry was whether the agency consid-
ered the relevant factors and whether there was a clear error of judg-
ment.217 The burden of proof was on the party seeking to overturn the
decision. 218 "Because NEPA does not contain judicial review provisions,
compliance with NEPA is reviewed under the APA[, and] an agency's
EIS may only be reversed or remanded if it is arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. 2 1 9 NEPA does not mandate particular results, but
rather prescribes the process under which agencies must take a hard look
at the environmental consequences of a proposed action. 220
The court looked to the three criteria established by the Fifth Circuit
for determining the adequacy of an EIS:
(1) whether the agency in good faith objectively has taken a hard
look at the environmental consequences of a proposed action and
alternatives; (2) whether the EIS provides detail sufficient to allow
those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and
consider the pertinent environmental influences involved; and (3)
whether the EIS explanation of alternatives is sufficient to permit a
reasoned choice among different courses of action.221
Due to the technical expertise required to analyze the EIS, the courts
grant the responsible agency considerable discretion. 222
The plaintiffs raised four challenges to the EIS. In their first count, the
plaintiffs claimed that the computer models used by the Corps were
manipulated to create nonexistent economic benefits for the proposed
DFE project. Finding a factual disagreement between the plaintiffs and
the Corps, the court advised that it is not a tie-breaking technical expert
and would defer to the informed discretion of the Corps on this issue. 223
In their second count, the plaintiffs claimed that the Corps violated
NEPA by failing to fully disclose environmental impacts and discuss alter-
natives. The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the Corps failed to
disclose cumulative impacts of the DFE and past actions on water eleva-
tion, finding that NEPA does not require that an EIS address past cumu-
lative impacts.224 The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the EIS
failed to discuss the flooding that would occur in downtown Dallas if the
DFE were not constructed.225 The court found that the Corps had con-
sidered and rejected the "no action" alternative, and was required only to
216. Id. at 595.
217. Id. at 596.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 597.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 598 (quoting Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 174 (5th
Cir. 2000)).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 599-600.
224. Id. at 605.
225. Id. at 606-07.
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discuss briefly its reasons for eliminating that alternative. 22 6 The plain-
tiffs also claimed that the Corps violated NEPA by failing to consider
alternative means for protecting downtown Dallas from flooding, such as
the much more cost-efficient alternative of raising the existing Dallas
Floodway by two feet.2 2 7 The court found that the stated purpose of the
DFE was to expand flood protection to areas downstream from the Dal-
las Floodway.228 Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the Corps to not
include raising the existing Floodway as an alternative because it did not
satisfy the purpose of the project.
In their third count, the plaintiffs claimed that the Corps "violated
NEPA by failing to analyze other foreseeable future projects that are con-
nected to the DFE project" and their cumulative impacts.2 29 The court
found that the DFE project was not "connected to" the Elm Fork Levee,
the Trinity Corridor Transportation Improvements, the Great Trinity For-
est, Trinity Parkway, the Woodall Rogers Bridge or the Chain of
Lakes. 230 The court based its holding on the facts that there was no evi-
dence that building the DFE would trigger any of the other projects, ap-
proval of the other projects by voters in bond elections does not mean
they will all be constructed, there was no evidence that the DFE could
not proceed unless the other projects are built before or contemporane-
ously with the DFE project, and there was no evidence that the DFE is
interdependent with any of the other projects.2 31 However, the court
agreed with the plaintiffs that the EIS violated NEPA with respect to
consideration of cumulative impacts of the foreseeable future projects.
The Corps claimed the future projects were not included in the EIS
because they were not "proposals" and the Corps had insufficient detail
to present a cumulative impacts discussion. 232 The court clarified that the
statute does not limit a discussion on cumulative impacts of foreseeable
future projects to only those that have been "proposed. ' 233 Rather, the
EIS must include a cumulative impacts analysis of foreseeable future ac-
tions that are not proposed actions to ensure that an agency does not
divide a project into multiple actions that, though individually insignifi-
cant, would collectively have a substantial impact.2 34 Finding a reasona-
ble basis to believe that some or all of the other projects would be
implemented, the court ruled that the Corps's failure to discuss the cumu-
lative impacts of any of the projects in the EIS violated NEPA and re-
manded the matter to the Corps "for further consideration of the
cumulative impacts of other similar, reasonably foreseeable future
226. Id.
227. Id. at 609.
228. Id. at 610.
229. Id. at 611-12.
230. Id. at 612-14.
231. Id. at 614.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 616-19.
234. Id. at 617.
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projects in the same geographic area of the DFE project. '235
V. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ISSUES
A. AGENCY RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY
In Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, the Supreme Court of Texas
held that the Edwards Aquifer Authority need not prepare "takings im-
pact assessments" (TIA) before adopting well-permitting rules and apply-
ing those rules to well permit applications. 236 The Braggs filed an action
to have declared void the Authority's proposed actions on their permit
applications for their two pecan orchards. 237 In applying its well-permit-
ting rules, the Authority's general manager proposed capping the number
of acre feet of water that the Braggs could withdraw for the Braggs' first
orchard, and denying the application for a well permit for the Braggs'
second orchard. 238 This recommendation was based upon historical use
data supplied by the Braggs in their permit applications. 239
Before the Authority acted on the recommendation of its general man-
ager, the Braggs filed suit against the Authority seeking to invalidate the
recommended action on their applications and the Authority's rules as
they pertained to the Braggs' application, for failure to prepare TIAs
under the Texas Property Rights Act. 240 The Texas Property Rights Act
provides a cause of action for real property owners based on governmen-
tal action taken without preparing a TIA, if the Act requires a TIA.241
The district court ruled in the Braggs' favor, and the Authority
appealed. 242
Affirming the court of appeals' reversal of the district court's ruling,
the supreme court determined that the Authority's actions are generally
subject to the Property Rights Act's requirements unless an exception to
the Act applies. 243 The supreme court reasoned that the Authority's
adoption of well-permitting rules is not covered by the Act.244 The Au-
thority's act of adopting well-permitting rules was taken under its statu-
tory authority to prevent waste or to protect the rights of owners of
interest in groundwater, which exempts it from the Act.245 Furthermore,
under the Act's plain language, well-permitting is not an action subject to
235. Id. at 618-20. The plaintiffs' fourth count, which alleged that the Corps violated
the APA by failing to follow a 1988 record of decision, was decided on the basis that the
plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show defendants violated the APA. Id. at 620-22.
236. Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729, 737 (Tex. 2002).
237. Id. at 730-32.
238. Id. at 732.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 732-33.
241. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.021, 2007.044 (Vernon 2000).
242. Bragg, 71 S.W.3d at 733.
243. Id. at 735.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 736-37.
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the TIA requirement. 246 Accordingly, the Braggs' challenges to the Au-
thority's rules and its proposed actions to their permit applications were
ultimately denied.2 47
B. RIPENESS
In City of Waco v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission,
the Austin Court of Appeals addressed the ripeness of a challenge of the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission's ("TNRCC") author-
ity to issue permits to confined animal feeding operations ("CAFOs") in
the Bosque River watershed, after the TNRCC withdrew a February 2000
order regulating future CAFO permits. 248 The City of Waco sought a
declaratory judgment that the TNRCC's "interim policy" of issuing
CAFO permits in the Bosque River watershed violated state regula-
tions.249 After the district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction due to ripeness, the City appealed the district court's
decision. 250
Erath County, which is in the Bosque River watershed, is a leading
county in Texas for milk production and contains many large-scale, clus-
tered dairy operations.251 Runoff containing dissolved agricultural waste
from those dairy operations is discharged to the Bosque River, which
forms Lake Waco near the point of confluence with the Brazos River.252
High levels of pollutants from the Bosque River watershed have ad-
versely affected the water quality of Lake Waco, the sole source of drink-
ing water for 150,000 Waco residents and a source of recreational
activity.2 5 3 As required under the Clean Water Act, the TNRCC listed
two segments of the Bosque River as having adversely affected water
quality and identified phosphorus, a nutrient found in animal waste, as
the primary source of pollution. 254 Several years after the TNRCC listed
the Bosque River watershed, the agency finally met the requirement of
submitting a Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") plan for assimilating
the pollutants present in the Bosque River water.255 The TMDL con-
firms that the dairy farms concentrated in the Bosque River watershed
produce a major controllable source of phosphorus and recommends a
246. Id. at 737.
247. Id. at 738.
248. City of Waco v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 83 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2002, no pet.). On September 1, 2002, the TNRCC began conducting busi-
ness under its new name, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. See 27 Tex.
Reg. 8340 (Aug. 30, 2002).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 173.
252. Id. at 172.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 174.
255. Id. Although the TMDL has now been submitted to the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency for approval, no TMDL had been approved by TNRCC when the City filed
its action or when it filed its brief on appeal. Id.
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large reduction in phosphorus loadings.256 The City contended that the
TNRCC's "interim policy" of continuing to issue CAFO permits to new
applicants for additional discharges of waste into the Bosque River vio-
lated regulations that require the TNRCC to implement measures to
achieve compliance with state water quality standards. 257
On appeal, the City argued that the Austin Court of Appeals was
presented with a pure question of law regarding the impact of section
122.4(i) of the EPA rules, which is incorporated into the TNRCC rules,
on the TNRCC's discretion to issue new permits for CAFOs that dis-
charge into the listed segments of the Bosque River.258 The City inter-
preted the language of section 122.4(i) as prohibiting the TNRCC from
issuing CAFO permits to new dischargers until the TNRCC promulgates
TMDL regulations for the contaminated Bosque segments.259 Under the
TNRCC's policy, the City argued, every new permit to discharge into the
listed Bosque River segments violates section 122.4(i).260 The TNRCC,
on the other hand, interpreted section 122.4(i) to merely limit the
TNRCC's ability to issue permits that cause or contribute to water quality
violations, without limiting the TNRCC's discretion to issue permits that
maintain the environmental status quo. According to the TNRCC,
whether a particular permit would cause or contribute to violations of
water quality standards depends in any given case on the specific condi-
tions and terms of that particular permit.261 Thus, the City's injury was
merely hypothetical and its claim would not become ripe until the agency
approved a permit that would cause or contribute to a violation of water
standards. 262
The doctrine of ripeness addresses when an action can be brought and
generally requires a concrete injury, rather than a hypothetical injury, in
order to create a justiciable claim.263 For a declaratory judgment action,
the facts must show the presence of "ripening seeds of a controversy," but
an actual injury need not have occurred. 264 A court's ripeness inquiry
involves two prongs: (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision, and
(2) the hardship occasioned to a party by the court's denial of judicial
review. 265 In evaluating the first prong, the court agreed with the City
that the issue presented was a purely legal inquiry and would not benefit
from the development of additional facts in connection with a particular
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 173 (discussing 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 305.538 (West 1999); 40 C.F.R.
§122.4 (2000)).




263. Id. at 175 (citing Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000);
Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993)).
264. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Banking v. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 27 S.W.3d
276, 282 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied)).
265. Id. at 177 (citing Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Publ. Util. Comm'n, 843 S.W.2d
718, 724 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied)).
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permit. 266 For the second prong, the court noted that the denial of judi-
cial review would allow newly issued permits to become final and remain
in effect even during pending appeals. 267 The court recognized that with-
out judicial review, the City would suffer harm because it would be forced
to make the same legal argument in multiple appeals.268 Accordingly, the
court held that the case was ripe for adjudication and remanded the mat-
ter to the trial court for consideration of the City's claim. 269
C. SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
In Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. Sierra Club, the
Supreme Court of Texas ruled that, when appealing a TNRCC order
under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act, the appellant need only serve
citation on the TNRCC.270 The appellant does not have to serve each
party of record to the agency proceeding with citation.271 Rather, the
appellant need only serve the parties with a copy of the petition filed in
district court.272 The supreme court determined that although the Texas
Solid Waste Disposal Act requires service of citation for an appeal per-
taining to a TNRCC order, only the proper defendant enforcing the
state's regulatory scheme, the TNRCC, need be served.2 73 The supreme
court further determined that the plain language of section 2001.176(b) of
the Texas Administrative Procedure Act only requires service of the peti-
tion of the parties to the agency proceeding. 274 Reading the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act and the Texas Administrative Procedure Act to-
gether, the supreme court concluded that service of citation on the
TNRCC alone is sufficient.275
D. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
1. Asbestos Work Practice Standards Are Valid Exercise of Commerce
Clause Authority
In United States v. Ho, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld the Clean Air Act's asbestos work practice standard and
requirement for providing notice of intent to remove asbestos as a valid
exercise of Congress's Commerce Cause Authority.276 In that case, Eric
Ho had undertaken the renovation of a hospital building that contained
asbestos in the fireproofing.277 Although the project involved asbestos
266. Id.
267. Id. at 178.
268. Id.
269. Id.




273. Id. (discussing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.321(c) (Vernon 2001)).
274. Id. at 814 (quoting 30 TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 2001.176(b) (Vernon 2000)).
275. Id.
276. United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 2002); see 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c).
277. Ho, 311 F.3d at 591-92.
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removal, Ho did not hire licensed asbestos abatement professionals or
take required precautions to protect workers who were unaware of the
presence of asbestos.278 Ho was convicted of criminal violations for fail-
ure to give notice of intent to renovate a facility involving removal of
asbestos and failure to comply with asbestos work practice standards. 279
On appeal, Ho contended that the Clean Air Act provisions under which
he was convicted exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.280
The asbestos work practice standard regulates the handling of asbestos
at building demolition and renovation sites where the buildings contain
certain amounts and specific kinds of asbestos.281 For example, the as-
bestos work practice standard requires that asbestos-containing material
be wetted during removal and stored in leak-tight containers until prop-
erly disposed.282 In addition, a manager trained in complying with the
work practice standards must be present at the site before workers handle
asbestos-containing materials. 283 Ho admitted that he did not comply
with those requirements or other requirements under the asbestos work
practice standards. 284 Ho also admitted that he failed to give the EPA
notice of intent to remove asbestos, as required under applicable federal
regulations. 285 Consequently, criminal penalties were imposed against
Ho for knowingly violating requirements of the asbestos work practice
standard and knowingly failing to provide the required notice of asbestos
removal. 286
Ho argued that the requirements of the asbestos work practice stan-
dard and the notification requirement for asbestos removal were uncon-
stitutional exercises of Commerce Clause authority as applied to him.287
Specifically, Ho contended that the government did not prove that asbes-
tos was released into the ambient air, therefore asbestos from the hospital
could not have polluted interstate air.288 Reviewing the constitutionality
of the statutes at issue de novo, the court recognized that although the
conviction was based entirely on intrastate activities, Congress has au-
thority to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 289 Thus, the limited question addressed by the court was
whether the aggregation principle, under which a wholly intrastate com-
mercial activity can substantially affect interstate commerce when aggre-
gated with similar and related activity, extends to violations of the
278. Id.
279. Id. at 593 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1), (c)(2)(B) (2002)).
280. Id. at 594.
281. Id. at 595 (discussing 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.145, 61.150 (2000)).
282. Id. (discussing 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)).
283. Id. (discussing 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)).
284. Id.
285. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(b)).
286. Id. (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1), (c)(2)(B) (2000)).
287. Id. at 594, 596.
288. Id. at 601.
289. Id. at 601-02.
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asbestos work practice standard.290
In analyzing the issue presented, the court first noted that the regulated
activity, asbestos removal, is a commercial activity and that Ho's activities
were motivated by commercial considerations. 291 Second, the court
found that the reach of the asbestos work practice standard was not lim-
ited by any type of jurisdictional element.292 Third, no congressional
findings or legislative history could be cited regarding the substantial ef-
fects that asbestos removal could have on interstate commerce. 293 The
court determined that use of the aggregation principle was justified in this
case because a direct and apparent relationship exists between Ho's vio-
lation of the asbestos work practice standard and interstate commerce.
Ho had gained an economic advantage by violating the asbestos work
practice standard, which injured the national market for asbestos removal
services. 294 Once aggregated with similar activities, Ho's activities
threatened the interstate commercial real estate market by potentially re-
ducing the number of asbestos removal companies and increasing the cost
of asbestos removal services. 295 The court held that Congress did not ex-
ceed its authority by aggregating violations of the asbestos work practice
standard to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce.2 96 For that
reason, the court upheld the asbestos work practice standard and the
Clean Air Act provision that authorizes the asbestos work practice stan-
dard.297 That holding, however, does not extend to other sections of the
Clean Air Act or to other environmental laws, and it is limited by apply-
ing only to commercial activities for which a national market exists. 298
With regard to the requirement for notice of intent to remove asbestos,
Ho argued that criminal penalties could be imposed only if knowledge of
the Clean Air Act's notice requirement is established.2 99 The Clean Air
Act states that criminal penalties may be imposed "on '[a]ny person who
knowingly fails to notify or report as required."' 300 Citing the maxim that
"[i]gnorance of the law is no defense," the court held that criminal penal-
ties could be imposed without a showing that the person had knowledge
of the notice requirement. 30' The government only needed to show that
Ho had knowledge of the underlying facts, meaning the presence of as-
bestos, and did not need to show knowledge of the law.30 2
290. Id. at 599, 602.
291. Id. at 602.
292. Id. at 603.






299. Id. at 605.
300. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(B)(2000)).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 605-06.
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In agreement with the government's contention on appeal, the court
held that the district court erred by declining to add "a six-level sentence
enhancement for an 'ongoing, continuous, or repetitive discharge, re-
lease, or emission of a hazardous or toxic substance or pesticide into the
environment.' '"303 The district court concluded that "into the environ-
ment" meant that the government was required to prove that asbestos
was discharged outside the hospital and that such proof had not been
established. 304 The Fifth Circuit, however, found that the government
had sufficiently proved a discharge outside the hospital. 30 5 Numerous
facts, including trial testimony of several witnesses and photographs of
the scene, supported the conclusion that asbestos must have escaped the
unsealed hospital continuously and repeatedly during the asbestos re-
moval. 30 6 An explosion at the hospital, which blew a hole in an exterior
hospital wall, and Ho's failure to seal the hole created by the explosion
had undoubtedly caused asbestos to be released from the hospital. 30 7 Be-
cause the government proved an asbestos discharge by preponderance of
the evidence, the court vacated Ho's sentence and remanded the case for
re-sentencing. 308
Similarly, the court held that the district court erred by declining to add
"a four-level sentence enhancement for Ho's status as 'an organizer or
leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive.'1, 309 The district court's interpretation of "otherwise
extensive" as referring to the nature of the criminal organization ignored
Fifth Circuit precedent, which directs that the number of participants and
persons involved in the offense be considered. 310 The court remanded
the case for re-sentencing consistent with the proper interpretation of the
phrase "otherwise extensive."'311
2. Taking of Private Property
The term "Taking" in environmental law has two meanings. One arises
under the Endangered Species Act and is the killing, disturbing or harass-
ing of an endangered or threatened species. These issues were discussed
in a prior case summary above. The other arises under the U.S. Constitu-
tion and under state constitutions and embodies the concept that the gov-
ernment may not take private property away from citizens without
providing just compensation. Taking of private property in environmen-
tal cases typically arises not from the government completely taking over
303. Id. at 608 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A) (1987)).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 608-609.
307. Id. at 609.
308. Id. at 610.
309. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) (1987)).
310. Id. at 610-611.
311. Id. at 611.
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property, but from the limitation of the property's use through legislative
or regulatory restrictions.
In Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston,312 the Court of Appeals for
Austin decided a case in which the plaintiff oil company asserted that
private property rights to explore for oil and gas were taken as a result of
the City's revocation of a permit to drill an oil well within a certain dis-
tance of Lake Houston. The City claimed that the permit had been is-
sued in error citing an ordinance that prohibited an oil well within 1000
feet of the lake within the City's extraterritorial jurisdiction.313 The oil
company had already expended funds to acquire leases for drilling and to
prepare the site for drilling.
The oil company asserted that the ordinance was unreasonable, that
the City was engaging in selective enforcement, and that the City's ac-
tions resulted in a taking without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Course of Law
provision of the Texas Constitution. Cross motions for summary judg-
ment were filed by both parties. 3t 4
The City's argument that the statute of limitations had passed was de-
nied because the ordinance actually only applied to the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the City, and the well was found within the City's city lim-
its. The City's no-evidence motion on economic damages was also re-
fused because the court found that the oil company had presented
sufficient evidence of market value reduction. The court ruled that the
City in this case may be subject to an estoppel defense because of its
behavior and the prejudicial reliance by the oil company, so summary
judgment was not appropriate for the City. However, the court ruled that
summary judgment was appropriate with respect to the oil company's
negligent misrepresentation claim.315
The oil company also asserted a selective enforcement claim. The test
was whether the individual prosecuted was selected out of others who
committed the same acts and whether the motivation of the government
was purposefully discriminating on the basis of an impermissible consid-
eration such as race, religion, or the desire to exercise constitutional
rights.316
E. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In City of Corpus Christi v. Absolute Industries, the court of appeals
clarified that, in determining whether a city has sovereign immunity or
may be sued in tort for its actions, the focus is on whether the actions
312. Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston, 69 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
pet. denied).
313. See id. at 356.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 370 (citing State v. Malone Serv. Co., 829 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1992));
United States v. Rice, 659 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1981); Wolf v. State, 661 S.W.2d 765, 766
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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giving rise to the claim are proprietary or governmental functions, rather
than on the context of those actions.317 Here, Absolute Industries ("Ab-
solute") had contracted with area refineries to collect and transport their
garbage to a private landfill for disposal. Absolute claimed that the City
threatened to retaliate against the refineries if they did not use garbage
collection services that would dispose of their garbage at the City's land-
fill. 31 8 In response, one refinery, Valero, capitulated to the City's threats
and cancelled its contract with Absolute. Absolute filed suit, claiming
that the City intentionally interfered with its contract with Valero. 319
Absolute Industries was an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's de-
nial of the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The City first claimed that,
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it could not be sued in tort for
its governmental functions and the legislature recognizes that the re-
moval, collection, and disposal of garbage is a governmental function.320
The court noted, however, that Absolute's claim centered on intentional
interference with contracts rather than on garbage collection. The re-
mote relationship between the City's act and garbage collection was in-
sufficient to make the City's act a governmental function. Because the
City allegedly undertook the act to avoid monetary loss, the court held it
was a proprietary function. 32 1 The court also rejected the City's claim
that it could not be held liable for intentional torts committed in its pro-
prietary capacity, citing more than one hundred years of cases holding
municipalities to the same liabilities and duties as individuals and corpo-
rations with regards to their proprietary functions. 322
In Maguire Oil Co., the oil company asserted an equal protection argu-
ment. In a so-called "class of one" case, the test asserted by the court was
that "the defendant deliberately sought to deprive [the plaintiff] of the
equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal nature unrelated to
the duties of the defendant's position. ' 323 The court ruled that the oil
company had raised sufficient factual questions about these issues and
denied the City's motion for summary judgment. The matter was re-
manded back to the trial court for further proceedings.
317. City of Corpus Christi v. Absolute Indus., No. 13-01-311-CV, 2001 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7581 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Nov. 8, 2001, pet. denied).
318. Id. at *1-2.
319. Id.
320. Id. at *4-6.
321. Id. at *6-7.
322. Id. at *7-9 (citing City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 127 (1884); Gates v.
City of Dallas, 704 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. 1986)).
323. Maguire Oil Co., 69 S.W.3d at 371 (citing Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d
1005, 1008 (7th. Cir. 2000)).
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VI. INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS
During the Survey period, the federal courts and state courts decided
several Texas cases that involved claims under insurance policies for envi-
ronmental contamination or remediation.
A. COVERAGE UNDER AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAIRMENT LIABILITY
POLICY FOR RSR LEAD SMELTER REMEDIATION
Two environmental insurance cases arose from disputes over a long
running clean up of lead smelting facilities in West Dallas and elsewhere
under an Environmental Impairment Liability policy ("EIL") issued to
RSR Corporation ("RSR"). The first case was International Insurance
Co. v. RSR Corp. ("RSR I,,).324 The pollution problems at the West Dal-
las smelting facility began in earnest in 1983, when RSR notified its insur-
ers, including the predecessor of International Insurance Company
("International"), of numerous environmental claims from adjacent
landowners. 325 In 1993, the EPA notified RSR of potential liability for
the West Dallas site under federal environmental laws.326 The coverage
issues in RSR I and RSR H involve EPA-mandated cleanup at the Dallas
site and a site in Washington ("Harbor Island Site"). The EIL policy cov-
ers cleanup costs, property damage, litigation, and certain other liabilities
involving property not owned by the insured.327
The primary issues in RSR I were whether: (1) the EIL policy covers
environmental cleanup and associated litigation costs with respect to any
portion of the impaired sites; (2) RSR waived coverage by not obtaining
the insurer's consent before entering a tolling agreement with the EPA;
(3) the insured timely asserted a claim under the claims-made coverage
for the Harbor Island facility; and (4) the insurer violated Texas Insur-
ance Code article 21.21 by making material misrepresentations regarding
the EIL policy. The court concluded that the policy covered cleanup
costs for one portion of the West Dallas facility and associated litigation
costs. 328 However, International asserted that the insured had waived
coverage by entering a tolling agreement with the EPA without the in-
surer's consent.329 The court agreed but held that the insurer could not
show that it had been prejudiced by a material breach of the policy's con-
324. Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., No. 3:00-CV-0250-P, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16569
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2001) [hereinafter RSR I].
325. In 1993, International assumed runoff coverage for the EIL policies, and RSR
agreed to the transfer of coverage from the predecessor insurer. See Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR
Corp., No. 3:00-CV-0250-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5337, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. March 27,
2002) [hereinafter RSR If].
326. The EPA had first notified RSR in 1982 that EPA was placing RSR's facility in
Harbor Island Washington on the Superfund list. RSR I, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *39.
327. Id. at *14. Actually, International's coverage was controlled under an 1885 escrow
agreement between RSR and its insurers, which International argued should be terminated
because the insurer's obligations had been discharged. Id. at *7.
328. Id. at *16.




The insurer also argued that the insured had not timely notified the
insurer of a claim for the Harbor Island facility in 1983 when the pollu-
tion was first discovered, but had instead waited until the 1992 EPA
superfund claims were asserted. 331 The court noted that the EIL policy
provided claims-made coverage and that timely notification was a condi-
tion precedent for coverage. 332 However, based on evidence that RSR
had discussed the Harbor Island facility with its insurer in 1983, the court
found that a material question of fact existed on the notice issue and al-
lowed RSR to pursue the claim.333
Finally, the court granted summary judgment against the insured's in-
surance code claims. The insured alleged that International's failure to
inform RSR that International was a "runoff company," whose function
was to handle existing claims and then go out of business, constituted a
material misrepresentation under article 21.21 because a runoff company
would not have sufficient incentive to properly defend and indemnify the
insured. 334 The court determined that because RSR could not point to a
provision of the policy that the insurer misrepresented and held that the
article 21.21 claim was not supported by substantial evidence.335
The second case, International Insurance Co. v. RSR Corp. ("RSR 1"),
primarily concerned whether the costs of cleaning up battery chips
originating from the West Dallas facility and used by area residents as fill
material were excluded from coverage. The costs would be excluded if
they had arisen from the following, which was excluded from coverage
under the policy: "Any commodity, article or thing supplied, repaired,
altered or treated by the insured and happening elsewhere than at the
insured's premises after the insured has ceased to own or exercise physi-
cal control over that commodity, article or thing supplied, repaired, al-
tered or treated. '336
International argued that the exclusion was unambiguous because the
discarded battery chips were clearly articles or things supplied or treated
by the insured and that the impairment happened elsewhere after the
insured had ceased to own the chips. 337 RSR countered that the drafting
history of the provision clearly showed that the exclusion was intended
only as a "products hazard" exclusion that excluded coverage only for
330. Id. at *24 (relying on Hernandez v Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 693-94
(Tex. 1994)).
331. Id. at *30.
332. Id. at *31.
333. Id. at *41.
334. Id. at *42 (discussing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(11)(a)) (Vernon 2001)
which prohibits "misrepresenting an insurance policy by (a) making an untrue statement of
material fact.").
335. Id. at *43-44.
336. RSR II, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *14-15.
337. Id. at *23.
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RSR's products sold in the course of its business.338 The court found that
the plain language of the exclusion was clear and the cleanup costs were
excluded. 339 The court held that RSR had "supplied, repaired, altered or
treated" the battery chips when it took apart the batteries at the West
Dallas facility and stockpiled the chips, thus making them available to
residents as fill material. 340 The court also found that the policy did not
cover cleanup costs on the landfill facility itself because of an exclusion
not covering liability or costs in connection with: "Upgrading, monitor-
ing, neutralizing, restoring, land filling, cleaning up or inactivating in any
waste disposal sites used directly or indirectly by the Insured or for which
they may be otherwise be responsible."'341
However, the court rejected the insurer's argument that the residential
area where the battery chips were found was a "waste disposal site."342
B. COVERAGE UNDER COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
POLICIES FOR ARSENIC RELEASES FROM A COTTON GIN
Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston General Insurance Co., 34 3 in-
volved the following issues: (1) coverage under lost policies; (2) a "sud-
den-and-accidental" pollution exclusion; (3) Texas Insurance Code, art.
21.21 § 4(10); and (4) choice of law. Chickasha Cotton Oil Company
("Chickasha") or its predecessors operated a cotton gin in Commerce,
Texas from the mid 1950s until approximately 1969. In 1995, hundreds of
claimants in counties surrounding the cotton gin sued Chickasha for al-
legedly releasing arsenic into the atmosphere, causing property damage
and personal injuries.344 Chickasha claimed that it had purchased pri-
mary liability insurance from Houston General Insurance Company
("Houston General") from at least 1944 through 1972 and had purchased
both primary and umbrella policies from Houston General from 1972
through 1986. However, Chickasha could find no policies before 1972.
Instead, the insured provided the affidavit of an employee who had
worked for Chickasha from 1937 until 1984, whose duties included the
purchase of general liability insurance purchased from Houston Gen-
eral.345 Chickasha also produced mandatory insurance forms from the
Department of Insurance, specimen policies from Houston General, and
338. Id. at *24 The court engaged in a lengthy examination of a Delaware case that had
examined the same language, Monsonto Co. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., NO. 88C-JA-1 18, 1994
Del. Super LEXIS 191 (Del. Sup. Ct. April 15, 1994), rev'd by 652 A.2d 36 (Del. 1994).
RSR II, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5337, at *17-22. The primary issue in those cases however
depended on the application of Missouri law, which permits extrinsic evidence to deter-
mine if a policy is ambiguous.
339. RSR It, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5337, at *29.
340. Id.
341. Id. at *30.
342. Id. at *31.
343. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., No. 05-00-01789-CV (Tex.
App.-Dallas Aug. 6, 2002) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5692.
344. Id. at *2-3.
345. Id. at *9-10.
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ledgers reflecting amounts paid for "PL" insurance.346
1. Lost Policies
The court concluded that this evidence constituted some evidence of
the existence of the policies and the policy terms for the relevant period
in question. Accordingly, the court held that Houston General had a
duty to defend the underlying lawsuits. However, because the insured
could not establish any evidence to determine the policy limits, the court
held that Houston General had no duty to indemnify the insurers under
any of the lost policies.347
2. Sudden and Accidental Exclusion
For post 1972 umbrella policies, Houston General asserted that the
"sudden and accidental" type pollution exclusion excluded all cover-
age. 348 The court held that, although the pollution exclusion barred cov-
erage for the bodily injury or property damage claims, the umbrella
policies also covered "personal" injury, which included coverage for
"bodily injury, sickness, disease, disability or shock, including death aris-
ing from therefrom, or if arising out of the foregoing, mental anguish and
mental injury. ' 349 The court noted that the claimants in the underlying
litigation had alleged injuries for severe emotional distress, fear of ad-
verse health consequents, mental anguish, skin irritations, cancer, tumors,
birth defects and other physical disorders. These "personal injuries" were
not subject to the pollution-exclusion clause. 350
3. Bad Faith Claims
Chickasaw also asserted bad-faith claims alleging that Houston Gen-
eral had engaged in unfair settlement practices in violation of Texas In-
surance Code. 351 Chickasaw asserted that Houston General's denial of
coverage for the pre-1972 period constituted a material misrepresentation
346. Id. at * 10-12.
347. Id. at *13.
348. The pollution exclusion provided:
It is agreed that this policy does not apply to bodily injury or property dam-
age arising out of discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste material or other
irritates, contaminates or pollutants into or on land, the atmosphere or any
water course or body of water; this exclusion does not apply to such dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape if sudden or accidental.
Id. at *16.
349. Id. at *17.
350. Id.
351. Id. at *21 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(10) (Vernon 2001)). Al-
though the court determined that Chickasaw's art. 21.21 claims actually pre-dated the addi-
tion of § 4(10) to the insurance code, the identical provision was contained in Art. 21.21-2,
§ 2(b)(4), which defined in unfair practice as "'not attempting in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims submitted in which liability has become
reasonably clear."' Id. at *24-25. Art. 21.21, § 4(10) now defines an unfair to include
"'failing to attempt good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a
claim with respect to which the insurer's liability has become reasonably clear."' Id. at *25.
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that violated section 4(10).352 The court rejected Houston General's ar-
gument that, under Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., a misrepresentation that a
party will fulfill its duty under contract is not a violation of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. 353 The court found
that the representation that Houston General did not sell policies during
a certain period is not a mere failure to perform its contract and, there-
fore, reversed summary judgment for the insurance company. 354
Chickasha had asserted that Arizona law should govern the bad-faith
claims. The court applied the most-significant-relationship test described
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS, section 6 and 145
(1971). 355 Chickasha is a Delaware corporation whose primary place of
business is Arizona. Houston General is a Texas insurance company with
its primary place of business in Texas. Houston General's alleged misrep-
resentations about coverage emanated from its Fort Worth office in
Texas.356 Chickasha argued that the applicable law was the law of the
state where the policyholder was affected by the alleged bad-faith acts.357
The court held that SnyderGeneral Corp. did not mandate that the policy-
holder's state law would govern the bad faith claim, but rather held only
that the policyholder's location was one of the applicable factors. The
court determined both Texas and Arizona had a significant interest in
matters relating to the violation of the insurance laws and concluded that
the underlying court had not erred in determining that Texas had the
more significant relationship to Chickasha's bad-faith claims.358 The
court also upheld the trial court's rejection of Chickasha's assertion of
regulatory estoppel holding that the insurer waived argument on this
point by failing to cite sufficient argument of authorities.359
C. COVERAGE FOR MOLD CLAIM
At issue in Lexington Insurance Co. v. Unity/Waterford-Fair Oaks,
Ltd.,360 was coverage for mold damage to first and second floor apart-
ment units and other damage to second floor units caused by severe rain
and flooding. The property policy at issue contained a "Pollution and
Contamination Exclusion" providing the following:
This policy does not cover loss or damage caused by, resulting from,
contributed to or made worse by actually, alleged or threatened re-
352. Id. at *23 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. Art. 21.21 § 4(10)(b)O.
353. Id. at *28 (citing Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996)).
354. Id. at *28-29.
355. Id. at *29 (Citing Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979), which
adopted the most-significant-relationship test for tort cases.)
356. Id. at * 30.
357. Id. at *32 (citing SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 674
(N.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that Texas law applied to bad faith claims although Minnesota
law governed the interpretation of the policy)).
358. Id. at *33.
359. Id. at *34-36.
360. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Unity/Waterford-Fair Oaks, Ltd. No. 3:99-CV-1623-D, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3594 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2002).
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lease, discharge, escape or dispersal of CONTAMINANTS or POL-
LUTANTS, all whether direct or indirect, proximate or remote or in
whole or in part caused by, contributed to, or aggravated by any
physical damage insured by this policy.361
The definition of "contaminants or pollutants" includes "bacteria,
fungi, virus, or hazardous substances as listed in the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, and other state and federal laws." Lexington asserted
that the mold damage that had developed in the first and second floor
units after a large rain storm fell within the exclusion because mold
spores that caused the damage are "fungi," which was listed as a contami-
nant.362 The insured countered that the mold had not "escaped," nor had
been "released, discharged, or dispersed. '363 The insured argued the
mold was already present and simply thrived because of the moisture.
The court disagreed and held that the evidence established that safe
levels of fungal mold spores existed in virtually all homes and businesses
but, due to the influx of water, the mold spores in this case proliferated,
"giving off reproductive spores that are dispersed via the air and the sur-
rounding environment. ' 364 The court also noted that the testimony of
Lexington's expert that some spores actually shot out of the organism
itself and some floated away because they were very buoyant.365 The
court held that the mold that caused the damage was dispersed within the
covered properties and therefore the damage was excluded. 366
The Lexington court also rejected the insured's argument that damage
to second floor unit was caused by roof leaks (not mold) and should be
covered. Lexington asserted an "anti-concurrent clause" that excludes
damage caused in part by "faulty, inadequate or defective planning,...
remodeling or maintenance of part or all of the property. '367 Lexington's
expert testified that the roof showed lack of maintenance including inef-
fective patching, improper repairs to flashing, the existence of debris on
the roof and ponding in numerous areas.368 The court found that Lexing-
ton met its burden of proving that inadequate maintenance was a contrib-
uting cause of the damage.369
D. COVERAGE UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
POLICY FOR RUPTURE OF SALT WATER DISPOSAL PIPELINE
In American Equity Insurance Co. v. Castlemane Farms, Inc.,370 the
court held that alleged property damage arising out of the accidental rup-
361. Id. at *4.
362. Id. at *5.
363. Id. at *6-7.
364. Id. at *8.
365. Id.
366. Id. at *9.
367. Id. at *11-12.
368. Id. at *14.
369. Id. at *16.




ture of a salt water disposal pipeline by a landscape company was ex-
cluded under a general liability policy pollution exclusion because salt
water is a "contaminant" when introduced on property. The insured in
this case, K-Bar Service, Inc. ("K-Bar"), was hired by the Texas Depart-
ment of Transportation to landscape the right-of-way to a highway and
allegedly ruptured a salt-water disposal pipeline owned by Exxon-Mobil
Production Company causing the discharge of salt water onto adjacent
land.371 The property owner sued and K-Bar requested defense and in-
demnification from American Equity.
The insurance policy in question contained a "total pollution exclu-
sion," providing that the policy: "[did] not apply to... 'bodily injury' or
'property damage' which would not have occurred in whole or in part but
for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seeping, migra-
tion, release or escape of 'pollutants' at any time. '372 The policy defined
"pollutants" as "'any solid, liquid, gas or thermal irritant or contaminant,
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and
waste.' "373
The insured argued the phrase "irritant or contaminant" was ambigu-
ous but failed to present any alternative meaning for these terms.374 The
court noted that the parties did not dispute that the contents of salt water
disposal pipeline fell within the category of "liquid waste. ' 375 Accord-
ingly, the court held that salt water was a "contaminant" and held that
the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the insured in the under-
lying lawsuit.376
VII. CONCLUSION
As promised, this Survey of Texas environmental cases for the past
year provides a glimpse into many of the varied types of environmental
disputes that reach our federal and state courts. A great variety of issues
were presented in last year's cases that will provide useful precedent for
the environmental law practitioner.
371. Id. at 810.
372. Id. at 813.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 814.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 815.
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